Abstract: This section provides an overview of cases in front of the Court of Justice of the European Union concerning contract law. The present issue covers the period between the beginning of
quately for the use of their protected works or other subject-matter. AdvocateGeneral Cruz Villalón came to the conclusion that the exception in Article 5 is only applicable to private copies made from lawful sources and not to those made from counterfeited or pirated sources. National legislation which makes no distinction between private copies made from lawful sources and those made from counterfeited or pirated sources is not in compliance with the Directive.
-Seizure of a counterfeit watch from a non-member country sold by private sale over the internet to an individual residing in a Member State: Judgment in case 98/13 Blomqvist 6 February 2014 (CJEU). In the case at hand, Mr Blomqvist, a resident of Denmark, ordered a watch described as a Rolex from a Chinese on-line shop through the English website of the seller. The parcel sent by post from Hong Kong was inspected by the customs authorities on arrival in Denmark. They suspended the customs clearance of the watch, suspecting that it was a counterfeit version of the original Rolex watch and that there had been a breach of copyright. Rolex then requested the continued suspension of customs clearance, having established that the watch was in fact counterfeit, and asked Mr Blomqvist to consent to the destruction of the watch by the customs authorities. However, Mr Blomqvist refused to consent to the destruction of the watch, contending that he had purchased it legally. The CJEU held that according to Regulation No 1383/2003, 2 the holder of an intellectual property right over goods sold to a person residing in the territory of a Member State through an online sales website in a non-member country enjoys the protection afforded to that holder by that regulation at the time when those goods enter the territory of that Member State merely by virtue of the acquisition of those goods. The customs regulation introduces no new criterion for the purposes of ascertaining the existence of an infringement of intellectual property rights, which has to be ascertained under the conditions laid down by the copyright directive, the trade mark directive and the Community trade mark regulation. In this regard, the requirement of EU law under the respective instruments that the sale be considered, in the territory of a Member State, to be a form of distribution to the public must be considered proven where a contract of sale and dispatch has been concluded. It is not necessary, in addition, for the goods at issue to have been the subject, prior to the sale, of an offer for sale or advertising targeting consumers of that State.
-Clickable links' giving access to protected works: Judgment in case 466/12
Svensson 13 February 2014 (CJEU). In the case at hand, a group of journalists brought an action against Retriever Sverige concerning compensation allegedly payable to them for the harm suffered as a result of the inclusion on that company's website of clickable hyperlinks redirecting users to press articles in which the applicants hold the copyright. Retriever Sverige operates a website that provides its clients, according to their needs, with lists of clickable Internet links to freely accessible articles published by other websites. It is disputed whether if a client clicks on one of those links, it is apparent to him that he has been redirected to another site in order to access the work in which he is interested. The CJEU held that under Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/ 29/EC, the provision on a website of clickable links to works freely available on another website does not constitute an 'act of communication to the public'. Making available the works concerned by means of a clickable link does not lead to the works in question being communicated to a new public. The public targeted by the initial communication consisted of all potential visitors to the site concerned, since, given that access to the works on that site was not subject to any restrictive measures, all Internet users could therefore have free access to them. Since there is no new public, the authorisation of the copyright holders is not required for such a communication to the public. However, 'where a clickable link makes it possible for users of the site on which that link appears to circumvent restrictions put in place by the site on which the protected work appears in order to restrict public access to that work to the latter site's subscribers only, and the link accordingly constitutes an intervention without which those users would not be able to access the works transmitted, all those users must be deemed to be a new public, which was not taken into account by the copyright holders when they authorised the initial communication. ' Therefore, in the absence of a relevant unit-trust related contractual link between the unit-holder and the representative, the unit-holder must legitimize himself towards the representative by using the means established in this respect in the fund rules and applicable national law. The management company could hardly authorize its local representative to make payments and execute redemption or re-purchase units vis-à-vis a unit-holder without such proof. After clarifying that background point, the Advocate-General concluded that it is impossible to infer from the words 'payments to unit-holders' in Article 45 of Directive 85/611 an obligation on the local representative of a UCITS, in the Member State of marketing, to deliver unit certificates to unit-holders. -Remuneration to authors for the communication of their works by means of television or radio receivers to patients in bedrooms in a spa establishment: Judgment in case 351/12 OSA 27 February 2014 (CJEU). The preliminary reference arose out of the proceedings between OSA, a musical works copyright collecting society, and a company managing a health establishment provid-ing spa treatment services, concerning the payment of copyright licence fees for the making available of works transmitted by radio or television in its bedrooms. Firstly, in line with the result reached by Advocate-General Sharpston, 4 the CJEU held that the national legislation which excludes the right of authors to authorise or prohibit the communication of their works, by a spa establishment which is a business, through the intentional distribution of a signal by means of television or radio sets in the bedrooms of the establishment's patients is contrary to Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29.Secondly, the CJEU clarified that Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29 cannot be relied on by a collecting society in a dispute between individuals for the purpose of setting aside national legislation contrary to that provision. The national court is required to interpret that legislation, so far as possible, in the light of the wording and purpose of the directive in order to achieve an outcome consistent with the objective pursued by the directive. Thirdly, the CJEU held that the national legislation, which grants a collecting society a monopoly over the management of copyright in relation to a category of protected works in the territory of that Member State, must be considered as suitable for protecting intellectual property rights, since it is liable to allow the effective management of those rights and an effective supervision of their respect in that territory. Considering that the territory-based copyright protection encompasses also reciprocal representation agreements, the national legislation does not go beyond what is necessary to attain the objective of protecting intellectual property rights. There is therefore no breach of Article 56 TFEU by preventing the spa establishment from benefitting from the services of a collecting society established in another Member State. However, the imposition by that copyright collecting society of fees for its services which are appreciably higher than those charged in other Member States (a comparison of the fee levels having been made on a consistent basis) or the imposition of a price which is excessive in relation to the economic value of the service provided are indicative of an abuse of a dominant position under Article 102 TFEU.
-Responsibilities of digital service providers towards copyright holders: Judgment in case 314/12 UPC Telekabel Wien 27 March 2014 (CJEU). A German and an Austrian company which hold rights to various films became aware that their films could be viewed or even downloaded from the website 'kino.to' without their consent. At the request of those two companies, the Austrian courts prohibited UPC Telekabel Wien, an internet service provider established in Austria, from providing its customers with access to that site. UPC Telekabel considers that such an injunction cannot be addressed to it, because it did not have any business relationship with the operators of kino. to and it was never established that its own customers acted unlawfully. UPC Telekabel also claims that the various blocking measures which may be introduced could, in any event, be technically circumvented, and some of those measures are excessively costly. The CJEU held that Article 8(3) of Directive 2001/29/EC means that a person who makes protected subjectmatter available to the public on a website without the agreement of the rightholder is using the services of the internet service provider of the persons accessing that subject-matter, which must be regarded as an intermediary. It does not require a specific relationship between the person infringing copyright and the intermediary against whom an injunction may be issued. Nor is it necessary to prove that the customers of the internet service provider actually access the protected subject-matter made accessible on the third party's website. This is due to the objective of the directive, which requires not only that infringements of copyright and of related rights are brought to an end, but also that they are prevented. The fundamental rights recognized by EU law do not preclude a court injunction prohibiting an internet service provider from allowing its customers access to a website placing protected subject-matter online without the agreement of the rightholders when that injunction does not specify the measures which that access provider must take and when that access provider can avoid incurring coercive penalties for breach of that injunction by showing that it has taken all reasonable measures. In order to strike a fair balance between the various fundamental rights at stake, the measures may not unnecessarily deprive internet users of the possibility of lawfully accessing the information available and the measures must have the effect of preventing or making it difficult of having unauthorised access to the protected subject-matter.
Consumer Protection
Advertising 
Insurance
-Limitation of the right to compensation for non-material damage in the event of road traffic accidents: Judgment in case 371/12 Petillo 23 January 2014 (CJEU). 6 The Italian Tribunale di Tivoli asked the CJEU whether the Italian legislation, which lays down a specific compensation scheme for non-material damage resulting from minor physical injuries caused by road traffic accidents complies with Article 3(1) of the First Directive 7 and Article 1(1) and (2) of the Second Directive. 8 The respective Directives require the Member States to ensure that civil liability in respect of the use of vehicles normally based in their territory is covered by insurance, and specifies, inter alia, the types of damage to be covered by that insurance. With reference to its judgments in Marques Almeida, 9 Drozdovs 10 and Haasová, 11 the CJEU held that the Italian legislation does not affect the European guarantee that civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, determined according to the applicable national law, will be covered by insurance. The CJEU pointed out that the Italian legislation is intended to determine the extent of the victim's right to compensation on the basis of the insured person's civil liability and does not limit the insurance cover against civil liability. Moreover, the Italian substantive civil liability law does not automatically excludes or disproportionately limits the victim's right to compensation through compulsory insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles. Particularly, first, compensation is granted, secondly, the more restrictive method of calculating that compensation is applicable only to damage arising from minor physical injuries, thirdly, the amount resulting from that calculation scheme is proportionate to the seriousness of the injuries suffered and the duration of the disability suffered and, fourthly, the national court can adjust the amount of compensation to be granted. It is irrelevant that the Italian scheme for non-material damage resulting from minor physical injuries caused by road traffic accidents is less favorable to the victim than that applicable to the right to compensation of victims of accidents other than road accidents.
Passenger rights and package holidays -National minimum percentage rule for the security that a travel organizer must provide to refund the money paid by consumers in the event of insolvency: Order in case 430/13 Baradics and Others 16 January 2014 (CJEU). The national proceedings concern an action by several individuals seeking recovery of the payments that they made on account or of the total price paid for the purchase of a travel package. The travel organizer became insolvent prior to the start of the trips booked by the appellants. The refund obtained by the appellants amounted to only 22% of the payments made. In the preliminary reference by the Hungarian Fővárosi Ítélőtábla, the national implementation of Directive 90/314/EEC 12 was at stake, which sets the amount of the security that a travel organiser or retailer is required to provide by reference to the percentage of net turnover achieved on projected sales of travel packages in the course of the relevant accounting year or to a minimum amount to be determined. According to Article 7 of the Directive, the travel organiser and/ or retailer party to the contract is required to provide sufficient evidence of security for the refund of money paid over and for the repatriation of the consumer in the event of insolvency. On the basis of its case-law in Dillenkofer 13 and Rechberger, 14 the CJEU held that Article 7 requires national legislation to achieve the result of ensuring that the consumer is provided with an effective guarantee of the refund of all money paid over and repatriation in the event of insolvency on the part of the travel organiser. In accordance with division of responsibilities between the national courts and the CJEU under Article 267 TFEU, it is for the Hungarian court to establish whether that is the case as regards the national legislation at issue. Next, the CJEU answered the question of the Hungarian court whether the national legislation could constitute a sufficiently serious infringement of EU law as to afford a right to reparation. Since the Member State has no discretion as regards the ambit of the risks that fall to be covered by the security under Article 7, criteria that would have the object or effect of limiting the ambit of that security would clearly be incompatible with the obligations under the Directive 90/314 and would accordingly constitute a sufficiently serious infringement of EU law, which, subject to a finding of a direct causal link, might give rise to liability on the part of the Member State concerned. 
Unfair contract terms
-Interpretation of the concept 'significance imbalance' in Article 3(1) Directive 93/13/EEC: 16 Judgment in case 226/12 Constructora Principado 16 January 2014 (CJEU). In this case, the consumer purchased a dwelling from Constructora Principado SA. The contract provided in one of its clauses that the purchaser is responsible for payment of the municipal tax on the increase in value of urban land and of the charges for individual connection to the various utilities, such as water, gas, electrical power, drainage, etc. The consumer brought an action before the Spanish courts for repayment of the sums paid on the basis of that alleged unfair clause. It appears from Spanish law that the tax liability and the charges at issue have to be borne by the seller. In this context, the Spanish Audiencia Provincial de Oviedo asked the CJEU whether the imbalance referred to in Article 3(1) has to be interpreted as arising merely from the act of passing on to the consumer an obligation to pay which by law falls on the seller or supplier, or does the fact that the Directive requires the imbalance to be significant mean that, in addition, the financial burden on the consumer must be significant in relation to the total amount of the transaction. The CJEU clarified that the existence of a 'significant imbalance' cannot be limited to a quantitative economic evaluation based on a comparison between the total value of the transaction which is the subject of the contract and the costs charged to the consumer under that clause. It can result solely from a sufficiently serious impairment of the legal situation under national law in which the consumer is placed as contracting party, whether this be in the form of a restriction of the national rights which the consumer enjoys under that contract, or a constraint on the exercise of those rights, or the imposition on him of an additional obligation not envisaged by the national rules.
-Debt in respect of a loan which is denominated in a foreign currency: Opinion in case 26/13 Kásler and Káslerné Rábai 12 February 2014 (CJEU). The consumers concluded a loan agreement in which the amount of the total sum to be returned as well as that of each individual installment were calculated in a foreign currency (Swiss Franc). While the total outstanding amount was calculated on the basis of the rate the bank applied when buying Swiss Francs, the installments were based on the sale rate. The referring Hungarian court raised various questions in that regard: Firstly, whether the contractual clause concerning the rate of exchange of the currency, which was not individually negotiated, may be exempted under Article 4(2) of Directive 93/ 13. Secondly, whether, in case the term was exempted under Article 4(2), the national court may still examine, regardless of the provisions of its national law, the unfairness of the contractual clauses referred to in that article, provided that such clauses are not drafted in a clear and intelligible manner. Thirdly, whether, in case of an unfair term, the national court would have to leave the gap of the unfair clause unfilled, or could apply supplementary legal provisions to determine the amounts due. According to Advocate General Wahl, the contractual clause concerning the rate of exchange of the currency is in principle exempted from the test of unfairness on substantive grounds as it forms part of the contract's main object. However, the difference between the exchange rates could not be considered as a price whose adequacy vis-à-vis the service rendered cannot be taken into account when scrutinizing a term's fairness. By a conforming interpretation of national law with EU law, the national court must examine the unfairness of the contractual clauses referred to in Article 4(2), provided that such clauses are not drafted in a clear and intelligible manner. This should not be exclusively based on linguistic elements, but consider whether, in the context of the case, the consumer was in a position to assess the rights and obligations arising from the contract. Finally, the national court may replace the term by a supplementary provision of the relevant national law, especially when the contract would be likely incapable to continue in existence if the gap is not filled. -Right of consumer protection associations to intervene in enforcement proceedings: Judgment in case 470/12 Pohotovosť 27 February 2014 (CJEU). 17 The preliminary reference arises out of the legal proceedings between Pohotovost' and Mr Vašuta (hereafter 'the consumer') concerning the enforcement of an arbitration award ordering the consumer to repay sums arising out of a consumer credit contract. The Slovak court decided to suspend the proceedings for enforcement of the arbitration award in respect of part of the debt in so far as the recovery of the interests of late payments and thereto related costs are concerned, but authorised enforcement in respect of the remainder. The Consumer Protection Association HOOS seeks leave to intervene in the enforcement proceedings, because it is of the view that the Slovak court has failed to provide the consumer with sufficient protection ex officio against the unfair arbitration clause and has failed to draw the legal inferences from the failure to indicate the annual percentage rate in the consumer credit contract. While the Slovak Code of Civil Procedure allows a consumer protection associations to be granted leave to intervene in litigation concerning the substance of a case involving a consumer, the Enforcement Code precludes such a right. As that matter is not governed by Directive 93/13, the CJEU refers to the principle of procedural autonomy as limited by the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. The CJEU held that the Slovak legislation, which does not allow a consumer protection association to intervene in proceedings for enforcement of a judicial decision or a final arbitration award does not breach the principle of effectiveness. Neither Article 38 nor Article 47 of the Charter can give rise to an interpretation of the Directive 93/13 which would encompass such a right.
Consumer credit
-Penalties for the failure to assess the borrower's creditworthiness prior to the conclusion of a credit agreement: 18 requires in Article 8 that the Member States ensure that the creditor examines the consumer's creditworthiness based on information provided by the consumer and through a consultation with relevant databases. Article 23 obliges the Member States establish effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for breach of the provisions of the Directive. The CJEU held that in order to determine whether the severity of the penalty is commensurate with the seriousness of the infringement, the national court must compare the amounts which the creditor would have received by way of repayment of the loan if it had complied with its obligation to assess, prior to conclusion of the agreement, the borrower's creditworthiness by consulting the relevant database, with the amounts which it would receive if the penalty for breach of that prior obligation were applied. If the application of the penalty of forfeiture of entitlement to contractual interest is liable to confer an advantage on the creditor, since the amounts which it forfeits are less than those resulting from the application of interest at the increased statutory rate, it would follow that, clearly, the system of penalties does not ensure that the penalty incurred is genuinely dissuasive. A bank would have no incentive to check the consumer's creditworthiness if the amounts which the creditor is likely to receive following the application of that penalty are not significantly less than those which that creditor could have received had it complied with that obligation. The CJEU reminds the national court of the obligation to interpret national law consistently with objectives of the Directive.
Competition Law, Public procurement and State Regulation
-Conditions for the application for compensation for financial burdens arising from a public service obligation: Opinion in joined cases 516/12, 517/12 and 518/12 CTP 6 February 2014 (CJEU). Compagnia Trasporti Pubblici SpA ('CTP') provides local public transport services in the Province of Naples and it has lodged repeated, unsuccessful, applications with the regional and local authorities for compensation for the economic disadvantage suffered as a result of the provision of those services. The Italian administrative court dismissed the appeals against the decisions refusing compensation on the grounds that, in accordance with Article 4 of Regulation No 1191/69, 19 compensation may be applied for only where an application has previously been submitted for termination of the public service obligation and that application has been refused by the competent authority, which was not the case. As pointed out by Advocate-General Cruz Villalón, the first point to determine is whether the nature of the legal relationship between CTP and the local authority is to be classified as a 'public service contract', in which case Article 14(2) is applicable, or a 'public service obligation', in which case Article 4 of Regulation No 191/69 is applicable. In case the Italian Consiglio di Stato takes the view that the relationship at issue satisfies the concept of a public service obligation, Advocate-General Cruz Villalón proposes that for the right to compensation to arise, a prior application for termination of the obligation is required only in the case of public service obligations that existed when Regulation No 1191/69 entered into force, ie 1 July 1969.
-Claim for compensation on the basis of umbrella pricing: Opinion in case 557/12 Kone 30 January 2014 (CJEU). As described by Advocate-General Kokott in her opinion, the 'elevator cartel', which involved the conclusion of anticompetitive agreements between major European manufacturers of elevators and escalators, operated in several Member States over a period of many years. The European Commission uncovered that cartel and imposed fines for the elevator cartel's practices on the Belgian, German, Netherlands and Luxembourg markets. The proceedings at hand deal with the claim of ÖBBInfrastruktur AG, who had purchased from a manufacturer that was not involved in the cartel elevators the price of which had in its opinion been set under the protection of the elevator cartel and was as such higher than would otherwise have been expected under competitive conditions. For the loss it suffered, ÖBBInfrastruktur is suing the four undertakings involved in the elevator cartel for damages before the Austrian civil courts. On the basis of Austrian national civil law, the claim would have to be dismissed since undertakings party to a cartel cannot be held responsible for umbrella pricing. According to Advocate-General Kokott, Article 85 of the E(E)C Treaty and Article 81 EC (now Article 101 TFEU) preclude the interpretation and application of domestic law which categorically excludes any civil liability of undertakings belonging to a cartel for loss resulting from the fact that an undertaking not party to the cartel, benefiting from the protection of the cartel's practices, set its prices higher than would otherwise have been expected under competitive conditions. After pointing out that the issue of the civil liability of cartel members for umbrella pricing is not a matter for national law but for European law, the Advocate-General considers what specific conditions may be attached under European Union law to the establishment of a causal link between a cartel and umbrella pricing. In this regard, from the case-law of the CJEU, the Advocate-General identifies the criterion of a sufficiently direct causal link, which ensures that a person who has acted unlawfully is liable only for such loss as he could reasonably have foreseen for loss the compensation of which is consistent with the objectives of the provision of law which he has infringed. Loss resulting from umbrella pricing is not loss the occurrence of which is always atypical or unforeseeable by the members of the cartel and the compensation of that loss is consistent with the objectives of Article 101 TFEU. It will always be necessary to carry out a comprehensive assessment of all the relevant circumstances in order to determine whether the cartel in the case in question has given rise to umbrella pricing.
Employment law and Discrimination
-Excluding the category of managers from the scope of the redundancy process under Directive 98/59/EC: 20 Judgment in case 596/12 Commission/Italy 13 February 2014 (CJEU). The Commission submitted that, by excluding the category of managers from the scope of the redundancy process (procedura di mobilità) when implementing Directive 98/59/EC, the Italian Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 1(1) and (2) of Directive 98/59/EC. According to the Italian Civil Code, managers are included within the concept of a worker. The category of managers in Italian law is very broad and includes workers not entrusted with particular management powers but those that possess a high level of professional qualifications. The directive regulates the procedure for informing and consulting with the workers' representatives when an employer is contemplating collective redundancies. Such procedures apply to dismissals effected by an employer for reasons not related to the individual workers concerned, where the number of redundancies is above a certain threshold set by reference to the number of workers in the undertaking. For that calculation, all workers are included, except those with contracts of employment concluded for limited periods of time, public employees and the crews of seagoing vessels. The CJEU confirmed the view of the Commission.
-Notice period for the termination of a fixed-term employment contract: Judgment in case 38/13 Nierodzik 13 March 2014 (CJEU). Ms Nierodzik was employed by a psychiatric health care institution for 24 years. During that period, they were bound by an employment contract of indefinite duration, which was terminated by mutual agreement at the request of the employee in order to take early retirement. Subsequently, the psychiatric health care institution concluded a fixedterm contract with Ms Nierodzik for part-time employment for 5 years, pursuant to which the employer could unilaterally terminate that contract at the end of a two-week notice period without any justification. After unilateral termination of the fixed-term contract by her employer, Ms Nierodzik brought an action before court claiming that the conclusion of a fixedterm contract for a period of several years was unlawful, as it was intended to circumvent national law and deprive her of the rights she could have relied upon if she had had an employment contract of indefinite duration. According to the Polish Labour Code, the termination of fixedterm contracts of employment of more than six months, a fixed notice period of two weeks may be applied regardless of the length of service of the worker concerned, whereas the length of the notice period for contracts of indefinite duration is fixed in accordance with the length of service of the worker concerned and may vary from two weeks to three months. The CJEU was asked whether the national law complies with clause 4(1) of the Framework Agreement read together with Article 1 of Directive 1999/70, clause 1 of the Framework Agreement and the principle of non-discrimination. 21 Clause 4(1) of the Framework Agreement lays down, in respect of employment conditions, a prohibition on treating fixedterm workers in a less favourable manner than comparable permanent workers solely because they have a fixedterm contract or relation unless different treatment is justified on objective grounds. The CJEU firstly clarified that the definition of 'employment conditions' within the meaning of clause 4 (1) includes the notice period for the termination of fixedterm employment contracts. While it is for the national court to determine whether Ms Nierodzik, when she was working under a fixedterm employment contract, was in a situation comparable to that of other workers employed on a permanent basis by the same employer for the same period, the fact that she previously occupied the same post, as an employee with a contract of indefinite duration, may constitute evidence to support a finding that her situation as a fixedterm worker was comparable to that of a person with a contract of indefinite duration. If that is confirmed, the application of notice periods of different length constitutes different treatment in respect of employment conditions. The CJEU rejected the arguments of the Polish government that the difference between the two types of employment contracts lies in their length and the stability of the employment relationship.
-Fixedterm employment contract of an associate lecturer at university: Judgment in case 190/13 Márquez Samohano 13 March 2014 (CJEU). The employee signed an employment contract with the Universitat Pompeu Fabra ('the UPF'), for the purpose of exercising the duties of part-time associate lecturer for a one-year period. That contract was renewed on three occasions, each time for one further year. After UPF informed the employee of its refusal to renew his employment contract for another time, the employee brought an action before the Juzgado de lo Social No 3 de Barcelona against the UPF, whereby he sought the annulment of his dismissal or, alternatively, a finding that that dismissal was unfounded. The Spanish courts notes that unlike the general rules applicable to fixedterm employment contracts, the Spanish rules applicable to universities do not lay down, in respect of the employment of associate lecturers, any equivalent legal measure to prevent the abusive use of successive fixedterm employment contracts. The CJEU made clear that an associate lecturer of a university, whose employment contract, according to the provisions of national law, must necessarily have been entered into for a fixed period, falls within the scope of the Framework Agreement. Since the rules applicable to the applicant in the case at hand include no equivalent legal measure within the meaning of clause 5(1) of the Framework Agreement, and impose no limitation as to both the maximum total duration and the number of renewals of fixedterm employment contracts entered into by universities with associate lecturers pursuant to clause 5(1)(b) and (c), it must be examined to what extent the renewal of such employment contracts may be justified by an objective reason within the meaning of clause 5(1)(a). The CJEU held that temporary contracts appear to be capable of achieving the objective of enriching university teaching in specific areas by the experience of recognised specialists, because those contracts allow the development both of the competences of the persons concerned in the areas concerned and of the needs of the universities to be taken into account. However the national court must ascertain that, the renewal of the successive fixedterm employment contracts at issue was actually intended to cover temporary needs and not, in fact, used to meet fixed and permanent needs in terms of employment of teaching staff.
Leave
-Right to paid maternity leave after interruption of a period of unpaid parental leave: Judgment in joined cases 512/11 and 513/11 TSN and YTN 13 February 2014 (CJEU). Two female workers decided to take unpaid parental education/childcare leave after their period of maternity leave. During that time, being pregnant for another time, they informed their employers of their intention to interrupt the parental education/childcare leave in order to take a new period of paid maternity leave. According to the applicable collective agreements, however, the entitlement to continued remuneration is dependent on the application of the requirement to resume work before taking another period of maternity leave. On the basis of its judgment in Kiiski, 22 the CJEU pointed out that the requirement at issue has the effect of dissuading a worker from deciding to exercise her right to parental leave under Directive 96/34, 23 having regard to the effect which that decision could have on a period of maternity leave which interrupts that parental leave. The Court recognized that a new pregnancy is not always foreseeable and that a worker is not always able to know, at the time of her decision to take parental leave or even at the start of that leave, whether she will need to take maternity leave during that leave. Therefore, the CJEU concluded that Directive 96/34/ EC precludes a national provision of a collective agreement, pursuant to which a pregnant worker who interrupts a period of unpaid parental leave in order to take, with immediate effect, a maternity leave within the meaning of Directive 92/85/EEC 24 does not benefit from the maintenance of the remuneration to which she would have been entitled had that period of maternity leave been preceded by a minimum period of resumption of work. Contrary, Advocate-General Kokott reached in her opinion of 21 February 2013 the opposite conclusion.
-Method of calculating the amount of fixed-sum protective award in case of dismissal of a worker on part-time parental leave: Judgment in case 588/12 Lyreco Belgium 27 February 2014 (CJEU). Ms Rogiers worked full-time for Lyreco under an employment contract of indefinite duration. On the day that Ms Rogiers should have resumed work after maternity leave on a half-time basis under parental leave, Lyreco terminated Ms Rogiers' employment contract with a notice period of five months. Lyreco was ordered by court to pay a fixed-sum protective award equal to six months' salary because of the unilateral termination of Ms Rogiers' employment contract, without compelling or sufficient reason, during her parental leave. However, the Belgian courts are in doubt whether the amount of that award had to be calculated on the basis of the salary paid to Ms Rogiers at the date of her dismissal, namely the salary corresponding to the half-time hours she worked on account of the part-time parental leave, or on the basis of the salary for full-time working hours. The CJEU clarified that the fixed-sum protective award equivalent to six months' salary as provided for by the Belgian legislation, may be classi-fied as 'measures to protect workers against dismissal on the grounds of an application for, or the taking of, parental leave,' within the meaning of clause 2.4 of the Framework Agreement. By relying on its judgment in Meerts, 25 the Court held that such a protective measure would lose a great part of its effectiveness if the fixed-sum protective award were to be determined not on the basis of the salary earned under the full-time employment contract but on the basis of the reduced salary earned during the part-time parental leave. It would lead, in breach of the objectives of ensuring proper social protection for workers who have taken parental leave, to increased job insecurity for workers who have chosen to take part-time parental leave, by rendering null in part the protective system established by clause 2.4 of the Framework Agreement, and thus seriously affecting a particularly important principle of Union social law. On that basis, they are therefore treated in law as the parents of that child. Her employer, the National Health Service Foundation, has a maternity leave and pay policy and an adoption leave and pay policy which equate to the statutory provisions on paid leave. However, no specific occupational or legal rules are provided for commissioning mothers in cases of surrogacy. Both applications of Ms D. for adoption leave and surrogacy leave were rejected. Contrary to the opinion of Advocate-General Kokott, 26 the CJEU held that the Member States are not required to provide maternity leave pursuant to Article 8 of Directive 92/85/EEC 27 to a female worker who as a commissioning mother has had a baby through a surrogacy arrangement, even in circumstances where she may breastfeed the baby following the birth or where she does breastfeed the baby. The CJEU followed from the objective of Directive 92/85, from the wording of Article 8 thereof, which expressly refers to confinement, and from the case-law of the Court in Hofmann, 28 Kiiski 29 and Betriu Montull, 30 that the purpose of the maternity leave is to protect the health of the mother of the child in the especially vulnerable situation arising from her pregnancy. While maternity leave is also intended to ensure that the special relationship between a woman and her child is protected, that objective concerns only the period after 'pregnancy and childbirth'. Consequently, the grant of maternity leave presupposes that the worker has been pregnant and has given birth to a child. Finally, the CJEU held that according to Article 14 of Directive 2006/54, 31 read in conjunction with Article 2(1)(a) and (b) and (2)(c) of that directive, an employer's refusal to provide maternity leave to a commissioning mother who has had a baby through a surrogacy arrangement does not constitute discrimination on grounds of sex.
-Discrimination by the refusal to grant maternity leave to a commissioning mother Judgment in case 363/12 Z. 18 March 2014 (CJEU). Ms Z., who works as a postprimary school teacher in Ireland, suffers from a rare condition that entails that, even though she has healthy ovaries and is fertile, she has no uterus and is accordingly unable to support a pregnancy. Together with her husband she decided to have recourse to surrogacy to have a child. The employment contract of Ms Z. includes a right to maternity and adoption leave but no provisions on surrogacy, which is unregulated in Ireland. When she formulated a request asking to benefit from adoption leave, her request was rejected on the basis that it did not comply with the legal requirements of adoption or maternity leave. The CJEU held that the refusal to grant maternity leave to a commissioning mother such as Ms Z. does not constitute direct or indirect discrimination on grounds of sex within the meaning of Article 2(1)(a) and (b) of Directive 2006/54. A commissioning father who has had a baby through a surrogacy arrangement is treated in the same way as a commissioning mother in a comparable situation, in that he is not entitled to paid leave equivalent to maternity leave either. Also, it cannot be establishes that the refusal to grant the leave at issue puts female workers at a particular disadvantage compared with male workers. Moreover, the situation of such a commissioning mother as regards the grant of adoptive leave is not within the scope of that directive. Directive 2006/54 preserves the freedom of the Member States to grant or not to grant adoption leave, and that the conditions for the implementation of such leave, other than dismissal and return to work, are outside its scope. Finally, the CJEU held Ms Z.'s condition does not constitute a 'disability' within the meaning of Directive 2000/78 32 as the inability to have a child by conventional means does not in itself prevent the commissioning mother from having access to, participating in or advancing in employment. Therefore, no discrimination on grounds of disability can be established. The judgment of the CJEU is in line with the opinion of AdvocateGeneral Wahl.
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Discrimination -Exclusion from training course for acquiring the status of a public official because of statutory maternity leave: Judgment in case 595/12 Napoli 6 March 2014 (CJEU). Ms Napoli was successful in the competition for appointment as deputy commissioner of the ordinary prison service corps and was admitted to the vocational training course scheduled. Three weeks before the start of the course, Ms Napoli gave birth and was therefore placed on compulsory maternity leave for three months. According Italian law, female staff whose absence of more than 30 days is attributable to maternity leave shall be permitted to attend the training course which follows the periods of absence from work. On that basis, the Prison Service Department informed her that, once the first 30 days of the maternity leave had elapsed, she would be excluded from the course concerned and that payment of her salary would be suspended. That department stated to her that she would be admitted as of right to the next course organized, the date of which is, however, uncertain. Ms Napoli challenged the decision before the Italian administrative courts. The referring court clarified that the Italian legislation at issue intends to ensure that only candidates who have been adequately prepared through the training course are employed in the prison service to carry out that task. The CJEU held that the training course, which is provided in the context of the employment relationship of Ms Napoli and intended to prepare her for an examination, which would allow her access to a higher grade, must be regarded as forming part of the working conditions within the meaning of Article 15 of Directive 2006/54. Article 15 provides that woman are entitled, after the end of the maternity leave, to return to their job or equivalent post on terms and conditions which are no less favourable. Being excluded from the vocational training course as a result of having taken maternity leave has a negative effect on Ms Napoli's working conditions and therefore constitutes unfavourable treatment for the purposes of Article 15. As stated by the CJEU, '[t]he other workers admitted to the first training course had the possibility of attending that course in its entirety and, if they were successful in the examination at the end of the training, of being promoted to the higher grade of deputy commissioner and of receiving the corresponding pay before Ms Napoli.' Even though the measure intends to protect the public interest, it does not comply with the principle of proportionality in view of the fact that it is uncertain when the next training course will be and that the public authorities are under no obligation to organize such a course at specified intervals. The CJEU clarified further that Article 14(2), which allows the Member States to introduce under certain conditions a difference in treatment based on sex where such a characteristic constitutes a genuine and determining occupational requirement is not applicable to the Italian legislation at issue. The Italian legislation does not limit a specified activity to male workers, but delays access for female workers who could not attend the full training course because of compulsory maternity leave. Finally, the CJEU held that Articles 14(1)(c) and 15 are sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional to have direct effect. , the court second seised is required to examine whether it has exclusive jurisdiction under Article 22(1), which would mean that the court first seised lacks jurisdiction and that any judgment given by the latter court would not be recognised under Article 35(1). Even though the wording of Article 27(1) provides that the court second seised is required to stay its proceedings 'until such time as the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established', by definition, it will never be possible to establish that jurisdiction when the court second seised alone has exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of the subjectmatter of the dispute, such as the exclusive jurisdiction resulting from Article 22(1) of that regulation. Since there are not two courts which both have jurisdiction, there is no positive conflict of jurisdiction to be resolved by application of the provisions of Regulation No 44/2001 relating to lis pendens. The Advocate-General concluded further that Article 28(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 requires the court second seised to take into account the right to effective judicial protection of the applicant who brought the second set of proceedings before it, but the following points are of no relevance: 'the fact that the court first seised is situated in a Member State in which proceedings, statistically and not in concreto, last considerably longer than in the Member State in which the court second seised is situated; the fact that, in the assessment of the court second seised, the law of the Member State in which the court second seised is situated is applicable; the age of one of the parties; or the prospects of success of the action before the court first seised.' -Circumstances under which the jurisdiction of the court first seised must be regarded as 'established' within the meaning of Article 27 (2) , the CJEU held that in order for the jurisdiction of the court first seised to be established within the meaning of Article 27(2), it is sufficient that the court first seised has not declined jurisdiction of its own motion and that none of the parties has contested that jurisdiction before or up to the time at which a position is adopted which is regarded by national procedural law as being the first defence. -Distinction of 'matters relating to a contract' and 'matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict' under Regulation No 44/2001: Judgment in case 548/12 Brogsitter 13 March 2014 (CJEU). The dispute arose between Mr Brogsitter, who is domiciled in Germany and sells luxury watches, and Mr Fräβdorf, a master watchmaker, who was at the conclusion of their contract domiciled in France. The parties concluded a contract, pursuant to which the latter undertook to develop two watch movements on behalf of Mr Brogsitter. Mr Fräβdorf carried out his activity with Fabrication de Montres Normandes. In addition to the work relating to those two movements, Mr Fräβdorf and Fabrication de Montres Normandes also developed other watch movements, which they exhibited in their own names at the world watch show in Basel. They marketed them in their own names and on their own behalf, whilst advertising the products online in French and German. Mr Brogsitter claimed for various purposes before the German courts that he has suffered damage from the conduct allegedly amounting to unfair competition. The defendants raised a plea of lack of jurisdiction on the basis that only French courts have jurisdiction, under Article 5(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, to determine all the applications made by Mr Brogsitter, as both the place of performance of the contract at issue and of the allegedly harmful event were situated in France. The Landgericht Krefeld was uncertain whether, given the existence of a contract between the parties, the claims for liability made in tort on the basis of the German Law against Unfair Competition should not also be considered as concerning 'matters relating to a contract' within the meaning of Article 5(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 and thus falling within the jurisdiction of the French courts. The CJEU held that civil liability claims made in tort must be considered as concerning 'matters relating to a contract', where the conduct complained of may be considered a breach of the terms of the contract, which may be established by taking into account the purpose of the contract. According to the CJEU, '[t]hat will a priori be the case where the interpretation of the contract which links the defendant to the applicant is indispensable to establish the lawful or, on the contrary, unlawful nature of the conduct complained of against the former by the latter.' The national court must examine whether the legal basis of the claim for damages can reasonably be regarded to be a breach of the contractual rights and obligations, which would make its taking into account indispensable in deciding the action. If that is not the case, those claims must be considered as falling under 'matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict' within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001.
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